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The  re-engineering  of  governmental  processes  is  a  necessary 
condition  for  the  realisation  of  the  benefits  of  e-government. 
Several obstacles to such re-engineering exist. These include: (1) 
information processing thrives on transparency and amalgamation 
of  data,  whilst  governments  are  constrained  by  principles  of 
privacy and data separation; (2) top-down re-engineering may be 
resisted effectively from the bottom up. This paper analyses these 
obstacles  in  the  way  of  re-engineering  in  Singapore  –  a 
democratic one-party state where legislative and executive power 
lies  with  the  People’s  Action  Party  –  and  considers  how  that 
hegemony has aided the development of e-government.  
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
In the complex world of the 21
st century, government is reliant 
upon  accurate  and  timely  information  about  its  legislative  and 
policy  contexts.  Whether  that  information  is  gathered  by 
governments, or provided by citizens and businesses, the quality 
of management of that information is vital [14]. 
The idea of e-government is to manage information and deliver 
services using information technology (IT) where possible. Using 
IT should create a number of benefits for government, including 
the standardisation of processes, efficiency of information transfer 
and storage and effective search, not to mention the decrease in 
the costs of information management. There should also be visible 
benefits  for  the  citizen,  including  the  simplification  of  the 
interface with government, the ability to manage one’s own case, 
and the lower taxes that should result from the reduction of the 
government’s costs. These benefits are naturally balanced by the 
costs  of  creating  giant  computer  systems,  and  of  the  re-
engineering required. 
The  issues  underlying  re-engineering  shouldn’t  be 
underestimated. It is very hard to turn staff-intensive and paper-
based systems into automatic digital systems, especially when the 
re-engineering  might  well  be  entrusted  to  the  very  staff  whose 
jobs  are  under  threat  from  the  transformation,  and  whose 
incentives  are  at  best  mixed.  It  is  also  very  hard  to  integrate 
systems  across  platforms  to  provide  seamless  service  for  the 
citizen. Furthermore, the chief driver of change is not pressure 
from without, but rather consciousness within government of the 
opportunity costs of not upgrading systems – a notoriously weak 
driver. 
As a result 21
st century e-government systems are often grafted 
onto 19
th century bureaucracies. This locks in the high costs of 
integration,  and  tends  to  create  islands  of  e-government  rather 
than allowing an integrated approach across government. 
Furthermore,  in  some  polities,  lack  of  trust  in  government, 
however  well-founded,  can  lead  to  scepticism  regarding  the 
benefits  of  efficiency.  Privacy  issues  loom  large.  Where  a 
government  possesses  large  quantities  of  information,  the 
guarantor  of  privacy  is  often  what  we  might  term  practical 
obscurity:  the  phenomenon  that  information,  often  paper-based 
and held in discrete repositories, though theoretically in the hands 
of governments is actually not useful because it cannot be found 
effectively  in  a  timely  way  [14].  This  is  particularly  true  of 
information  which  does  not  exist  explicitly  in  government 
archives, but rather could be deduced from information held in 
two or more other sources. 
Recent work on e-government has shown that interoperability and 
re-engineering  problems  can  interfere  seriously  with  the 
effectiveness of putting government services online. In particular, 
studies  have  highlighted  the  need  for  standards  to  support 
interoperability, security and privacy requirements that stem from 
the  amalgamation  of  databases  and  services,  and  process  re-
engineering  to  optimise  the  benefits  of  shifting  governmental 
services online [1], [21], [22]. 
Because businesses have to perform such re-engineering of legacy 
systems, and because they face similar difficulties, it is tempting 
to  treat  government  as  a  large  business  in  the  analysis  of  the 
problem. However, government has many drivers and difficulties 
of  context  that  businesses  do  not  face:  in  particular,  whereas 
businesses have the (relatively) straightforward goal of creating 
value for shareholders within the law, governments need to meet a 
wide range of targets. Furthermore, different governments need 
(or want) to meet different targets. 
This paper examines one key driver in a government’s approach 
to  the  process  of  governing:  ideology.  Differing  underlying 
ideologies  create  very  different  contexts  for  e-government 
systems. The form, and likelihood of success, of an e-government 





 assumptions  underpin  particular  polities.  We  will  examine  the 
experiences of e-government in an unusual democracy, Singapore. 
Section  2  discusses  the  context  for  and  experience  of  e-
government in Singapore, while Section 3 looks at ideologies and 
party structures in Singapore to consider what effect these may 
have. Section 4 concludes. 
2.  GOVERNMENT AND E-GOVERNMENT 
IN SINGAPORE 
2.1  The Impact of Geography and the Vision 
of Lee Kuan Yew 
Singapore is a tiny country, under 700km
2, containing about four 
and a quarter million people in 2004, of whom all but a few tens 
of  thousands  live  in  the  city  of  Singapore.  It  is  sandwiched 
between two much larger countries: Malaysia and Indonesia, each 
of  which  at  certain  times  in  their  histories  have  been  hostile. 
Ethnically,  Singapore  is  mixed,  with  76.3%  Chinese,  13.8% 
Malay  and  8.3%  Indian,  mostly  Tamil.  Securing  Singapore’s 
borders against invasion from without, and racial tension within, 
has been the central policy focus since independence [12]. 
The original Singaporean tactic for securing national borders was 
to become part of the original Malaysian federation with Malaya 
and  other  small  British  territories,  a  tactic  driven  by  Prime 
Minister  Lee  Kuan  Yew  and  his  People’s  Action  Party (PAP), 
which had won a decisive victory in the election of 1959. Serious 
discussions  were  underway  by  1961,  and  the  Federation  of 
Malaysia was created in 1963. 
However, this tactic failed: Singapore, having a largely Chinese 
population, was ethnically very distinct from the rest of Malaysia, 
and thanks to its strategic position on various trade routes was 
somewhat richer. Attempts to establish a common market within 
Malaysia between Malaya and Singapore foundered, and in 1965 
Lee  pulled  Singapore  out  of  the  federation,  declaring 
independence. 
Singapore  was  now in a difficult position, a minnow in shark-
infested  waters.  The  focus  of  Lee’s  PAP  government  became 
security,  and  the  vehicle  for  this  was  economic  growth,  which 
would  secure  the  legitimacy  of  the  government,  reduce  racial 
tension, and provide the funds for effective defence. As a result, 
much was sacrificed to the goal of effective government, which, 
while pursuing an open economy and eschewing disastrous import 
substitution, still maintained significant levels of control through 
government-linked  companies  such  as  the  giant  Temasek.  The 
PAP  government  has tried to keep Singaporean industry at the 
forefront of economic development, most recently by emphasising 
a ‘Knowledge-Based Economy’ [12]. 
Singapore remains democratic, and has frequent and fair elections. 
However, the PAP party machine has maintained a ruthless grip 
on  the  nation’s  politics  through  various  legal  barriers  and 
sympathetic media [16], and opposition parties have never, since 
independence,  achieved  more  than  a  handful  of  MPs  (some 
appointed by the PAP precisely to create an opposition) [13]. The 
situation, inconceivable in the West, is accepted because of the 
PAP’s  perceived  success  in  delivering  security  and  prosperity 
(GNP per head in 2003 was US$21,230, about the same as the 
UK, and several times that of its neighbours) [8]. 
2.2  Putting Government Online 
Singapore, an island with virtually no natural resources, has long 
viewed  IT  as  essential  for  leveraging  value  from  its  human 
resources. The PAP’s grip on government and the economy has 
enabled  it  to  coordinate  a  series  of  IT  strategies  for Singapore 
stretching back to the National Computerisation Plan (NCP) in 
1980 [20]. 
The  aim  of  the  NCP  was  to  prime  a  nascent  IT  industry,  and 
therefore focused on the creation of a pool of IT professionals. 
One  important  decision  with  ramifications  was  the  early 
computerisation of the civil service in a programme beginning in 
1982. Various schemes and plans followed the NCP, all aiming to 
increase  awareness  of  IT  in  government,  industry  and  the 
citizenry.  By  the  late  1980s,  e-government  functions  were 
appearing  frequently,  with  their  characteristic  ability  to  save 
citizens’  time  and  provide  standardised  information  for  the 
government  –  for  instance,  the  One  Stop  Change  of  Address 
Reporting  Service  (OSCARS)  meant  that  citizens  only  had  to 
report changes of residence once [20]. 
By  the  1990s,  Singapore  had  a  thriving  IT  industry,  and  was 
putting in place a National Information Infrastructure (NII). This 
connected computers in virtually every school, home and office, 
and  enabled  access  and  assimilation  of  information  from  many 
sources. By 2002, One Network for Everyone (Singapore ONE), a 
broadband framework comprising a high capacity network, and a 
set of advanced multimedia applications and services to exploit 
broadband capabilities, had been in place for five years. 99% of 
the island had access via ADSL, cable, wireless and fibre. 
Having  prepared  the  ground  for  an  IT-literate  culture,  e-
government developed quickly, with a relatively high take-up rate. 
In 2003, approximately 68% of tax returns were filed with the 
Inland Revenue Authority of Singapore (IRAS) electronically. By 
2005, 95% of services that could be delivered electronically were 
online. Some services, particularly G2B services such as BizFile 
(business  registration)  and  GeBiz  (procurement),  were  100% 
online  by  2005,  i.e.  there  was  no  analogous  paper  process. 
Singapore has always been innovative in the e-government field, 
and  an  early  adopter:  in  their  2004  report  on  worldwide  e-
government trends, Accenture ranked Singapore joint second with 
the USA (behind Canada) [1]. 
There are many examples of innovations in e-government in the 
interface  between  citizen  and  government  [10].  The  eCitizen 
portal,  set  up  in  1999,  provides  government  information  and 
services,  and  combines  a  number  of  agencies’  services  into  a 
single  point  access.  Winner  of  the  2002  Stockholm  Challenge 
award, the average monthly hit on the portal was 8.7 million by 
2003 [20]. A later generation of eCitizen, My.eCitizen, allowed 
personalised  features  and  customisation.  For  the  citizen, 
unification  of  e-services  was  promoted  with  a  common 
authentication  system  –  SingPass.  SingPass  allows  access  to  a 
range  of  services  using  a  single  password.  All  government 
policies are tested by an online consultation process via a special 
portal launched in 2003 by the government’s Feedback Unit. As 
noted  above,  the  lack  of  effective  opposition  in  Singapore  has 
been  seen,  even  by  the  ruling  PAP,  as  leading  to  poor 
policymaking and the development of a gap between citizenry and 
government [13], [12]. Public consultations via the Feedback Unit are one of the methods used to prevent this happening without the 
necessity of tolerating a Western-style opposition. 
Process re-engineering has also been boosted via the PSi (Public 
Service  Infrastructure),  launched  in  2001.  PSi  is  a  scalable 
infrastructure for government ministries and agencies to develop 
e-services,  consisting  of  the  components  required  for  e-
government application development (such as payment gateways, 
authentication systems, data exchange standards and so on). PSi 
abstracts  away  from  particular  issues  in  the  development  of  e-
services, and instead facilitates the conceptualisation of e-service 
implementation (and integration) with a uniform standard [20]. 
The Singaporean e-government strategy, therefore, is central in a 
number of ways to the PAP government’s long-term strategy as a 
whole.  First,  governmental  efficiency  is  an  end  in  itself  –  the 
PAP’s legitimacy is premised on the effective delivery of services, 
prosperity and security. Second, e-government is the way in which 
the critical function of political opposition is provided. Third, the 
infrastructure  assembled  by  the  e-government  programme 
provides  a  de  facto  standard  for  e-government,  and  therefore 
(given  the  targets  for  getting  governmental  services  online)  for 
government itself. Finally, the use of a small number of portals 
such  as  eCitizen  facilitates  the strong centralisation that allows 
top-down control of the economy and society. As has often been 
argued,  e-government  promotes  transparent  and  accountable 
government; the PAP is more than prepared to accept this, the 
quid pro quo being the opportunity to gather more information 
about  its  citizens  and  economy,  and  to  apply  that  information 
more effectively [16], [18]. 
3.  THE ROLE OF IDEOLOGY IN RE-
ENGINEERING 
3.1  The PAP’s Democratic Politics 
Singapore  is  a  parliamentary  democracy.  It  has  regular  clean 
elections. However, the PAP dominates politics through various 
illiberal methods. For instance, criticisms of PAP politicians can 
lead to punitive defamation suits [12]. An unusual first-past-the-
post  multi-member  constituency  system,  wherein  large 
constituencies elect five or six members and the party that gets 
most votes gets all the seats, penalises those opposition parties led 
by one or two prominent figureheads (i.e. all of them). And, with 
the government’s firm control of many aspects of daily life (most 
notably housing – the Housing and Development Board, one of 
the  PAP’s  most  successful  and  legitimising  ventures,  provides 
homes  for  about  86%  of  Singaporeans  [12]),  pressure  can  be 
brought at election time. Those estates that vote for the opposition 
might  find  themselves  at  the  bottom  of  the  waiting  list  for 
maintenance [15]. 
Nevertheless, there is nothing stopping Singaporeans voting for 
the  opposition.  The  harassment  of  opposition  politicians  is 
relatively common across the world, and such harassment is often 
the  cause  of  greater  support;  Singaporeans  are  relatively 
uninterested  in  party  politics,  and  do  not  seem  impressed  by 
martyrdom [13]. 
As noted earlier, the PAP’s legitimacy stems from the security and 
prosperity to which its 46-year rule has led. Furthermore, the PAP 
has the ability to reinvent itself; a fluffed election in 1984 (it got a 
‘mere’ 63% of the vote) led it to tolerate more opposition voices. 
Indeed,  the  PAP  has  never,  unlike  most  dictatorships,  tried  to 
avoid accountability for the effects of its policies. Opposition is 
co-opted and neutralised; those opposition leaders who choose to 
reside beyond the pale, such as Chee Soon Juan, leader of the 
Singapore  Democratic Party, seem strident and out of touch in 
comparison (cf. [4]). Singapore is not a liberal democracy in a 
Western sense, but it is a recognisable democracy. 
3.2  The PAP’s Pragmatic Ideology 
The PAP’s ideological aim of covering as much available space as 
possible is not unlike Clinton’s ‘big tent’ strategy. The idea is not 
to define one’s ideological enemies and energise one’s supporters 
as a result (strategies favoured by, e.g. George Bush and Jacques 
Chirac), but rather to attract uncommitted centrists. 
The  PAP’s  aim  was  to  naturalise  its  ideology,  to  make  its 
contestable ideological assumptions appear to be common sense. 
This  has  been  called  the  achievement  of  ideological 
hegemony/consensus [5]; the hegemony of the dominant ideology 
is achieved via creation of a consensus of citizens. 
The PAP’s ideology reflects its dominance in four ways [5]. 
1.  Because it is so widespread – taken as ‘common sense’ 
– it is not systematic, in the way that, say Marxism or 
green  theory  are.  Instead  it  works  by  contextual 
rationality; policies are designed for particular contexts, 
rather than based on governing principles. 
2.  There  is  a  perceived  unity  of  interests  between 
government and governed. Policing is perceived by the 
governed as necessary for the continuation of their own 
welfare. 
3.  Because of the focus on contextual rationality, a number 
of different interpretations of the dominant ideology are 
available. 
4.  Because  the  ideology  is  dominating,  it  cannot  be 
restricted to certain areas of life (e.g. politics). It must 
have a thoroughgoing influence. 
Given that the aim of the PAP ideology is survival, only activities 
that contribute to economic development are legitimate. Compare 
this to, say, the United Kingdom, another pragmatic nation, which 
has no serious threat to its survival; its pragmatism can afford to 
express  itself  in  allowing  non-standard  behaviour  to  flourish. 
Only recently did the British government begin to crack down on 
anti-social behaviour or Islamic extremism, and even then only 
since the ascent to power of Mr Blair, whose New Labour also 
aims for ideological hegemony/consensus. 
This picture of the Singaporean national ideology, it should be 
said, is not explicitly endorsed by the PAP, but equally the focus 
on  national  survival  and  identity  is  recognisable  to  both 
government  and  citizen  alike.  Explicit  statements  of  the PAP’s 
distance from the classical liberalism espoused by the West, for 
example, can be found in [11] and, canonically, [24]. 
3.3  Re-engineering Government 
How do the PAP’s political strategy and pragmatic ideology affect 
the  implementation  of  e-government  in  Singapore,  and  in 
particular re-engineering? We will begin by providing a sketch of 
structural aspects of the Singaporean civil service, and then look at  some  actual  cases  of  the  implementation  of  e-government 
programmes. 
3.3.1  The Singaporean Civil Service 
Singapore’s  civil  service  was  initially  trained  by  the  British 
colonial  rulers;  though  Singapore  was  not  especially  well-
governed by Britain (descriptions of pre-independence Singapore 
are almost impossible to reconcile with the reality of today [5]), 
the legacy of a neutral, competent, incorruptible civil service is 
one  that  Singapore  has  in  common  with  other  former  British 
territories. The PAP upon achieving power focused on retaining 
that legacy. A Political Study Centre, attended by civil servants at 
all levels of the hierarchy, instilled the PAP’s pragmatism while 
exposing  the  remnants  of  Singapore’s  once  widespread 
communism. 
The  civil  service  became  imbued  with  the  PAP’s  philosophy. 
First, selection by ability replaced selection by seniority, as part of 
the PAP’s meritocratic philosophy of maximising the ability of its 
leaders.  Second,  as  the  distinction  between  the  PAP  and  the 
government blurred, civil servants became increasingly loyal to 
both. Third, distinctions between public and private sectors were 
broken down. Power in Singapore is highly distributed between 
the  party,  parliament,  the  state  bureaucracy,  various  statutory 
boards  and  government-linked  companies.  A  top  civil  servant 
might reasonably expect a career that veered between any or all of 
these  loci.  And  fourth,  after  the  post-2000  focus  on  the 
knowledge-based economy, inflexibility and ‘playing safe’ were 
increasingly frowned upon [12]. 
In this context, the British-style civil service neutrality gradually 
evaporated; the value of that neutrality in a two-party system was 
always unlikely to be fully preserved in a de facto one-party state 
such as Singapore. Civil servants increasingly became tools of the 
ruling elite, and the interests of the two began to converge. Top 
civil  servants  would  be  identified  very  strongly  with  the  PAP 
government [3], [23]. In such a situation, the chances of the civil 
service  being  a  point  of  resistance  to  top-down  institutional 
change are relatively slim. 
3.3.2  Re-engineering Government and Implementing 
E-Government in Singapore 
As a result, we could hypothesise that the implementation of e-
government systems in Singapore would tend not to display the 
problems of re-engineering, typically caused by inertia, that we 
often see. The lack of incentive that civil servants can have to 
implement  an  e-government  programme  successfully  is  less 
obvious in the Singaporean system. A civil servant’s loyalty is not 
to the department, or to his or her boss, but rather to a complex 
congeries  of  boss,  department,  minister,  government,  party  and 
nation. 
Take, for example, the response of the government in combating 
the spread of the SARS virus during the 2003 outbreak [7]. The 
rapid spread of SARS through Southeast Asia, and the disastrous 
effect this had on the economies of affected nations, demanded an 
effective and speedy response. However, the scale of the problem 
threatened to overwhelm existing systems. In the first place, one 
infected  person  worked  at  a  widely-used  wholesale  market; 
furthermore, the first port of call of many patients was their local 
doctor  of  traditional  Chinese  medicine,  not  the  hospital.  The 
efforts to combat SARS, including the tracing and quarantine of 
those who had been in contact with infected persons, required a 
level of information processing that could not be carried out by 
those originally charged to undertake them, the hospital staff (who 
of  course  had  increasingly  many  other  duties  as  well  as  the 
number of infections rose). 
Very quickly – 43 days after the WHO’s initial global alert and 4 
days after the market incident – the Ministry of Health (MOH) 
had contacted the Ministry of Defence (MINDEF) about setting 
up a system for monitoring the health crisis. The Defence Science 
and  Technology  Agency  (DSTA),  a  specialist  agency  for 
delivering IT solutions for command and control problems, was a 
statutory board under MINDEF. An initial infrastructure was set 
up by DSTA within hours. 
There are a number of interesting factors from the point of view of 
process re-engineering. For example, the DSTA pointed out that 
MOH’s information processing operations wouldn’t scale up even 
with  the  technology  injection  as  they  were  not  streamlined 
enough;  much  of  the  information  was  either  in  hard  copy  or 
unstructured.  In  the  event,  the  DSTA  built a case management 
system  in  two  weeks,  with  a  complex  architecture  covering 
contact  tracing,  epidemiology,  disease  control,  frontline 
operations, and even the provision of leave of absence from work 
for those in quarantine. Nearly 200 different data formats needed 
to be resolved to do this [7]. What is extraordinary is that MOH 
cooperated  fully  with  the  DSTA’s  re-engineering  of  its 
information  management;  surely  the  experience  that  one  would 
expect  in  most  ministries  in  most  countries  would  be  inertial 
resistance to “outside interference” from “people who think they 
know  better”  (cf.  [9],  [17]).  The  structural  properties  of  the 
Singaporean civil service are a crucial variable for explaining this 
lack of territorial behaviour; the internal ethos of, in this case, the 
MOH  is  quite  sacrificeable  in  this  context  to  the  ‘national’ 
requirement of combating SARS. 
In a wider sense, cyclical models of software development can be 
unrealistic, in that in effect it is often the case that one side (either 
the developers or the users) dictates to the other. For example, in 
the  UK,  a  number  of  large-scale  government  automation 
initiatives have floundered because the treasury has insisted on 
micromanaging the process, which has prevented flexible software 
development. But in the Singaporean context, genuinely cyclical 
interactions  between  developers  and  users  are  ideologically 
sanctioned [6]. 
Another important variable relating to the success or otherwise of 
process  re-engineering  is  the  interface  with  the  public.  MOH’s 
response to SARS clearly has an aspect of this, but the main focus 
of the effort was in more efficient information processing. Any 
dealings with the public, particularly in e-government, need to be 
flexible  and  adaptable  in  very  dynamic  and  complex 
environments. A portal needs to be usable by novices and experts 
alike, and needs to be responsive to unanticipated demands. The 
model  –  a  very  typical  model  –  implicit  in  this  account  is  an 
agency  distributing  services  to  many  clients.  And  on  such  an 
account, re-engineering behind the scenes may well be painful and 
slow, especially if the workers in the agency itself see little of 
value emerging for them. 
However, the unifying and context-sensitive ideology of the PAP 
can aid process re-engineering even here, as we see in a study of the development of the IRAS electronic tax return filing system 
[19].  The  move  from  a  bureaucratic  structure,  via  increased 
communication  with  clients,  to  genuine  electronically-mediated 
dialogue  also  facilitated  a  shift  from  an  information-processing 
organization  to  one  that  could  anticipate  and  respond  to  new 
requirements.  Eventually,  IRAS’s  processes  were  able  to  take 
advantage  of  the  network  communication  structures  that 
electronic systems make possible. Instead of all communication 
being one-to-one, wider networks could be exploited. 
The  effect  of  reciprocity  shifting  from  a  two-way  to  an  n-way 
model is quite dramatic. For instance, in a two-way workplace tax 
relationship, employees are contacted by IRAS, and then contact 
their employer for documentation and details of the past year’s 
work. On a network model, there can be an immediate transfer of 
information  from  the  employer  to  IRAS,  overseen  by  the 
employee.  The  efficiency  gains  for  all  are  large;  whereas  the 
efficiency  gains  from  a  purely  reactive  system  can  also  be 
impressive, they come from increased operational efficiency (and 
therefore largely internal). Proactive systems can create value not 
only for themselves but with other stakeholders with which they 
are networked. Ultimately, IRAS hopes to establish a paperless 
tax  filing  paradigm  where  tax  information  is  channeled 
automatically into the relevant part of the e-filing system [19]. 
IRAS achieved these benefits in a number of ways, for example 
by inviting feedback. But its context also changed; it found itself 
out of governmental hierarchy and into a network. As Tan and 
Pan point out, ‘e-transformation is an essential step in altering the 
…  uncompromising  and  uncompetitive  nature  of  bureaucratic 
institutions  by  revolutionizing  the  relationships  between  the 
organization and its stakeholders. Moreover, the competitive edge 
to  be  obtained  from  any  e-transformation  strategy  is  intricately 
tied to the degree of connectivity between the organization and its 
stakeholders’ [19]. Once again, the structural properties of IRAS, 
driven  by  the  PAP’s  pragmatic  ideology,  diminishes  the 
likelihood of territorial behaviour, and increases the probability of 
such connectivity flourishing. The senior officials in IRAS are as 
likely  to  come  from,  or  go  back  to,  politics  or  business  as  up 
through the civil service hierarchy. But the PAP’s focus on the 
importance  of  the  nation  as  a  whole  also  helps  stop  such  a 
network simply becoming a ruling cadre; the political dimension 
is never absent. The civil service in Singapore is overtly political, 
and thereby more responsive to citizens’ needs than a hands-off 
bureaucracy [12]. 
Note also that in both cases discussed here, privacy issues would 
loom  large  in  any  liberal  democracy.  The  networks  that  IRAS 
wishes to set up would be offset by the need, in a polity where 
privacy  was  valued  and  suspicion  of  public  institutions  was 
endemic, to ensure that information flow was restricted. Indeed, 
the efficiency gains from data-sharing in e-government are often 
unavailable in countries where the government is not trusted to 
invade privacy (the UK’s latest plans, for example, make it clear 
that data-sharing is an important issue [21], [14]). 
4.  CONCLUSIONS 
The  purpose  of  this  paper  has  been  expository  rather  than 
normative.  We  do  not  suggest  the  adoption  of  a  PAP-style 
pragmatism as a first step to effective e-government. Rather, we 
have  argued  that  some  of  the  most  common hurdles to the re-
engineering  of  the  processes  of  government  necessary  for 
implementing e-government have proven less problematic in the 
case of Singapore. This has been, in part, because of the strong 
pragmatic and nationalistic ideology that values efficiency, grafted 
on top of an uncorrupt civil service. The effectiveness of the PAP 
government is a key legitimizing factor for its illiberal policies – 
were it not effective it would be at risk of rejection at the ballot 
box  (unlike  governments  in  many  single-party  states).  Such 
legitimation  also  sanctions  the  government’s  greater  use  of 
information, despite the invasion of privacy this entails. 
Via  the  examination  of  case  studies  we  have  seen  how  this 
ideological framework provides a number of advantages for the 
development of e-government. First, the reach of re-engineering is 
less  limited  in  the  Singaporean  context  because  the  inter-
departmental  and  agency  barriers  are  extremely  porous,  thus 
allowing seamless collaboration across agencies (rather than the 
replication  of  governmental  structures  behind  the  scenes  [7]). 
Second,  efficiency  is  at  the  core  of  the  process.  Structures  are 
capable  of  being  easily  remodeled  without  fear  of  creating 
territorial resentment within agencies. Finally, the porous nature 
of  the  system  of  government  and  the  pragmatic  approach  that 
drives it makes it very malleable. It can be adapted and adopted to 
changing  circumstances  very  quickly,  as  the  SARS  example 
illustrates. 
The desirability of such a system depends, of course, upon the 
willingness to trade off the benefits against the virtues of a more 
liberal  form  of  democracy.  How  that  trade  off  should  be 
calculated is not something we have considered herein. What we 
have  shown,  however,  is  that  ideology  plays  a  surprisingly 
important  role  in  the  understanding  of  the  cost  structure  of  e-
government  processes.  In  that  case,  one  might  expect  that 
hegemonic, centrist ideologies would support e-government rather 
more effectively than antagonistic ones. 
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